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A supply-side explanation of
European unemployment
Lars Ljungqvist and Thomas J. Sargent
In this article, we offer a
supply-side explanation of
two striking patterns in Euro-
pean unemployment as com-
pared with that of other mem-
ber countries of the OECD (Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development).1
(See figure 1 and table 1.)  The first pattern is
that of average unemployment rates.  These
were similar for European and non-European
OECD countries during the 1960s and 1970s,
but in the 1980s and 1990s average unemploy-
ment in Europe has persistently exceeded the
average in the OECD by about 2 percentage
points.  Second, since the 1980s, the average
duration of unemployment in Europe has great-
ly exceeded that in the rest of the OECD.  We
attribute these patterns to the incentive effects
on labor supply of unemployment compensa-
tion arrangements, which are far more gener-
ous in Europe than in the rest of the OECD.2
However, this view is challenged by the obser-
vation that unemployment compensation arrange-
ments have been more generous in Europe
throughout the post-World War II period,
during the first part of which European unem-
ployment was not higher than that for the rest
of the OECD.  We attribute the rise in unem-
ployment in Europe after 1980 to a change in
the environment that required increased adapt-
ability of those workers forced to change jobs.
We show that during tranquil times, with
less need for adaptability, unemployment rates
were the same with a generous unemployment
compensation system as they would have been
without such a system.  However, in turbulent
times, when greater adaptability is required, a
generous unemployment compensation system
could propel the economy into a state of persis-
tently high unemployment.3
The economic environment is generally
perceived to have become more turbulent in
the last two decades.  The OECD (1994) sums
it up as follows:
In the stable post-World War II eco-
nomic environment, standards of living in
most OECD countries grew rapidly, nar-
rowing the gap with the area’s highest per
capita income country, the United States.
The OECD area’s terms of trade evolved
favorably; trade and payments systems
were progressively liberalized, without
major problems; GDP and international
trade grew strongly.
In the 1970s, the economic environ-
ment became turbulent.  The two oil
price rises, in 1973/74 and 1979/80,
imparted major terms-of-trade shocks,
each of the order of 2 percent of OECD-
area GDP, and each sending large rela-
tive price changes through all OECD
economies. Exchange rates became vola-
tile after the breakdown of the Bretton
Woods system of fixed exchange rates.
Then there came, mainly in the 1980s,
waves of financial-market liberalization
and product market deregulation which
greatly enhanced the potential efficiency
of OECD economies, and also accelerated
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show that greater earnings instabil-
ity for individual workers accom-
panied the widening earnings distri-
bution in the U.S. labor market,
especially in the 1980s.  In fact,
half of the increased variance in
earnings for white males can be
attributed to transitory shocks that
die out within three years.
Thus, we attribute the diverse
unemployment rates observed in
Europe and the rest of the OECD
to the supply side of the labor
market and a changing economic
environment.  We focus on how
mechanisms intended to provide
social insurance also encourage
people not to work.  A threat of
adverse incentives haunts the deliv-
ery of social insurance and this
threat becomes larger in times of
economic turbulence.  Social
insurance works best when exposure to an
event cannot be affected by the insured person
(for example, acts of nature).  Our starting point
is that unemployment is only partly an act of
nature, beyond the control of the worker.  A
worker makes efforts to leave a state of unem-
ployment, and these efforts are influenced by
arrangements for compensating the worker for
being unemployed.
We use a search model that views the job
market as an information processing machine.
FIGURE 1
Unemployment rate in OECD as a percent














Sources: Data for 1961–77 are from OECD, Labor Force Statistics (1984)
and data for 1978–94 are from OECD, Employment Outlook (1995).
TABLE 1
Standardized unemployment rates and long-term unemployment
   of 12 months or more in OECD
Long-term unemployment
Average unemployment rate as percent of unemployment
1974–79 1980–89 1970 1979 1989
France 4.5 9.0 22.0 32.6a 43.9
Germany 3.2 5.9 8.8 28.7 49.0
Italy 6.6 9.5 -- 51.2 70.4
Spain 5.2 17.5 -- 32.8a 58.5
United Kingdom 5.0 10.0 17.6 29.5 40.8
OECD Europe 4.7 9.2 -- 31.5b 52.8
Total OECD 4.9 7.3 -- 26.6b 33.7
aData for 1980.
bAverage of data for 1979 and 1980.
Sources:  The data are from OECD, Employment Outlook (1991), table 2.7, except for long-term
unemployment in 1970 which are from OECD, Employment Outlook (1983), table 24.
the pace of change.  All these develop-
ments challenged the capacity of econo-
mies and societies to adapt.  At the same
time, the need to adapt was heightened
by pervasive technological change, espe-
cially as the new information technolo-
gies appeared, and by the trend towards
globalization.
Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994) and Moffitt
and Gottschalk (1995) provide empirical evi-
dence of increased economic turbulence.  TheyECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 4
The market tracks and sorts infor-
mation used to match workers and
jobs.  Workers and jobs have diverse
characteristics, and it is costly but
valuable to find good matches.
Market economies decentralize
job matching, leaving firms to
post vacancies and make offers
and workers to accept or reject job
offers.  From both social and pri-
vate viewpoints, the state of unem-
ployment—waiting for something
better—is partly an investment in
the future.
A search model of
unemployment
Our work extends John McCall’s
(1970) basic search model to cap-
ture the effects we think differenti-
ate Europe from the rest of the OECD.  Our
model is more complicated than McCall’s and
must be analyzed with a computer.  However,
many of the basic insights can be conveyed by
describing first a graphical version of McCall’s
model of a reservation wage, then a graphical
version of a model of search intensity.
McCall’s basic model confronts an unem-
ployed worker with choices about employment
status and focuses on the incentives that the
market and the state present to the worker.
The model provides a framework for under-
standing how different policies affect incen-
tives and outcomes.
Balancing benefits and costs of search
Each period, an unemployed worker draws
a wage offer from a probability distribution of
offers and decides whether to accept or reject
it.  Figure 2 shows a distribution of wage offers.
We let F(w –) denote the probability that a ran-
domly drawn offer is less than or equal to a
given wage, w –, and the wage offer exceeds w –
with probability 1–F(w –).  In the simplest mod-
el, an offer provides the worker with the oppor-
tunity to work indefinitely at the drawn wage.
The model also assumes that an unemployed
worker receives unemployment compensation
in a fixed amount per period for as long as he
or she is unemployed.  The worker’s optimal
policy is to set a reservation wage, at a level at
which the worker is indifferent about accepting
or rejecting an offer, then to reject offers fall-
ing short of the reservation wage, and to accept
the first offer exceeding it.  The model equates
FIGURE 2
 Wage offer distribution






being unemployed with waiting for an accept-
able offer.  The worker compares the benefits
of accepting an offer with the benefits of refus-
ing it, remaining unemployed, and searching
again next period.  The benefits of refusing
comprise any unemployment compensation
the worker receives this period, plus the option
value of searching again next period.  The
option value covers the possibility that the
worker might eventually draw a better wage
offer in the next period or a subsequent period.
Given a particular distribution of wage
offers, we can compute and plot the present
value of all benefits associated with a policy of
setting a reservation wage of w –. To compute
present values, we let r denote the one-period
interest rate.  Any benefits in the next period
can then be expressed in today’s value (present
value) when multiplying by the one-period
discount factor, b  = 
(1+r)
   .  Let Y(w –) be the
total benefits of rejecting  a job offer today,
while setting a reservation wage of w – for ac-
cepting a job in the future.  By accounting for
the various possibilities and weighting the
associated payoffs by the probabilities of oc-
currence, we can compute Y(w –) as follows:
1) Y(w –) = g + (1 – F(w –)) 
Ew –(w)
+ F(w –)bY(w –),
where g is the level of unemployment compen-
sation per period, and Ew –(w) is the expected, orFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 5
average, value of all wages exceeding a reser-
vation wage of w –.4
The right side of equation 1 expresses the
total benefits, Y(w –), as the sum of three terms:
1) g, the unemployment compensation to be
received this period; 2) the expected present
value from next period onwards of receiving
a wage exceeding the reservation wage,
Ew –(w)/r, weighted by the probability (1–F(w –)) of
receiving an offer next period exceeding w –;
and 3) the value of restarting the search process
next period, discounted one period by b, and
weighted by the probability F(w –), of not draw-
ing an acceptable offer next period.  Equation 1
can be rearranged to become
2) Y(w –) =
The optimal choice of reservation wage, w –,
is the one that maximizes total benefits, Y(w –).
For the same wage distribution shown in
figure 2, figure 3 plots the right-hand side of
equation 2 for unemployment compensation, g,
equal to zero and greater than zero.  Since
unemployment compensation enters positively
in equation 2, the curve with some unemploy-
ment compensation is higher than the curve
without any unemployment compensation.





1 – bF(w –)
Each curve shows how the benefits of the
search vary with the reservation wage.  For low
values of the reservation wage, the benefits
increase as the reservation wage increases, but
they eventually fall for higher values of the
reservation wage.  In other words, the unem-
ployed worker is better off choosing a reserva-
tion wage that is neither too low nor too high.
A too low reservation wage is not optimal,
since the worker would, on average, do better
by searching more for a somewhat higher
wage.  On the other hand, a too high reserva-
tion wage does not maximize benefits, since
the worker is then, on average, spending too
much time pursuing the rare opportunity of
getting a very high wage.  By setting the deriv-
ative of Y(w –) to zero, we find that the optimal
value of the reservation wage must satisfy
3) Y(w –) =      r
The term      
 r       is the benefit of accept-
ing a wage w – immediately (that is, the present
value of receiving a wage w – today and for all
future periods).  Thus, equation 3 says that the
worker optimally sets the reservation wage to
equate the total benefits of further search to the
total benefits of immediately accepting a wage
offer equal to the reservation wage.  In other
words, the worker is indifferent
between continuing the search
and accepting a wage offer that is
exactly equal to the optimal reser-
vation wage.  Figure 3 confirms
equation 3 graphically.  In figure
3, for each level of unemploy-
ment compensation, the curve
showing        r       intersects total
benefits Y(w –) at the highest value
of Y(w –) (as indicated in the figure
by a star).  Figure 3 shows how
an increase in unemployment
compensation increases the res-
ervation wage, because it shifts
upward the curve of benefits of
further search.
The reservation wage deter-
mines the probability of rejecting
a job offer by summing probabili-
ties attached to wage offers below
the reservation wage (see figure 2).
FIGURE 3
Expected present value of payoffs for different
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Notes:  Stars indicate the optimal reservation wage for each
unemployment compensation regime.  The dashed line shows the






The rejection probability F(w –) determines the
mean duration of unemployment via the formula
Duration =        1         .
Increases in F(w –) increase the mean duration
of unemployment.  We study how particular
policy and environmental features impinge
on the reservation wage and the duration of
unemployment.5
Variable search intensity
The basic search model assumes that one
offer arrives per period, irrespective of the
intensity of the worker’s job search.  We modi-
fy the model to let the worker influence the
probability of getting a job offer by selecting
the intensity of his or her search.  To indicate
the main factors affecting search intensity, we
temporarily assume that the wage distribution
is concentrated at a point, denoted w, so that all
jobs pay the same wage w.  With this assump-
tion, the only uncertainty becomes whether a
job offer arrives in the period.
We suppose that a worker chooses a prob-
ability, p, that an offer will arrive in a given
period, by incurring a utility cost, c(p), per
period.  We assume that the cost function c(p)
has positive and increasing marginal costs:
c(p) = 0, c¢(p) > 0, c¢¢(p) > 0.  If an unem-
ployed worker decides to search this period, he
or she receives unemployment compensation
and incurs search costs of c(p) this period.  The
worker then receives an offer with probability
p at the beginning of next period or no offer
with probability (1–p).  We let W(p) denote the
expected present value of searching with inten-
sity p.  We can compute
4) W(p) = –c(p) + g + p   r   + (1– p) bW(p).
The right side of equation 4 expresses the
benefits associated with search intensity p as
the sum of four terms: 1) –c(p), the negative
value of the search cost in the current period;
2) g, the unemployment compensation to be
received in this period; 3) the present value
from next period onwards of receiving a wage
 w,   
 
w
     r  
  , weighted by the probability, p, of
receiving an offer next period; and 4) the value
of restarting the search process next period,
discounted one period by b, and weighted by the
w
probability (1– p) of not drawing an offer next
period.  Equation 4 can be rearranged to become
5)    W(p) =     
1 – b(1 – p) 
    .
The optimal choice of probability, p, is the one
that maximizes total benefits, W(p).
Figure 4 displays the three components of
the right side of equation 5 as functions of the
probability of getting a wage offer, while figure
5 displays their sum for two different levels of
unemployment compensation, g, equal to zero
and greater than zero.  (These graphs assume the
particular cost function c(p) = 50p 4.) As shown
in figure 4, for a given level of unemployment
compensation, the expected present value of
received unemployment compensation decreas-
es as the probability of  an offer increases.
Moreover, the higher the level of unemploy-
ment compensation, the higher this curve in
figure 4.  It follows that the higher the level of
unemployment compensation, the lower the
probability of getting a wage offer (correspond-
ing to a lower search intensity) that maxi-
mizes the total benefits.  Figure 5 shows
how the optimal setting of the probability
declines as unemployment compensation
increases.  (We mark the optimal probability
for each level of unemployment compensa-
tion with a star.)
In this setting, the average duration of
unemployment is just  
p
  1  .  By causing the
probability (p) to decrease, increases in unem-
ployment compensation cause the mean dura-
tion of unemployment to rise.  Similar forces
operate in the more general model when the
distribution of offers is nontrivial. The main
difference is that the value of a wage offer in
the above equations must be replaced with a
value that depends on the worker’s reservation
wage, which is also influenced by the level of
unemployment compensation.  This is the case
we are interested in.
Extensions of the basic search model
To construct our theory of European un-
employment, we add three features to the basic
search model outlined above—job termination,
human capital/skills, and earnings-dependent
unemployment compensation.
Job termination—We have adjusted the
option value of searching for a job to reflect
–c(p) + g + p    r
w
1 – F(w –)FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 7
We let human capital appreciate
when the worker is employed,
and let it depreciate gradually
during spells of unemployment.
Human capital/skill levels differ-
entiate workers from each other;
unemployed workers with differ-
ent human capital levels set dif-
ferent reservation wages and
search intensities.
We specify a given number
of potential levels of human capi-
tal or skills, ordered from lowest
to highest.  We also specify two
sets of transition probabilities,
describing the change in skills
over time.  For example, we
would expect a worker’s skills
to improve during periods of
employment and, conversely, to
deteriorate during periods of
unemployment.
We define a worker’s total earnings as the
product of a base wage, to be drawn from a
given wage offer distribution, and the worker’s
skills.  During a spell of employment, a worker
who starts from a low level of skills can expect
his or her earnings to grow gradually as his or
her skills grow, even though the base wage is
set once-and-for-all at the beginning of the
current spell of employment.
The worker takes into account the
likely growth of earnings in for-
mulating the reservation wage
and search intensity.  The worker
also takes into account the way
unemployment compensation
depends on past earnings.
Earnings-dependent unem-
ployment compensation—The
basic model has a fixed level of
unemployment compensation,
independent of the worker’s earn-
ings during previous employment.
We modify this feature by linking
unemployment compensation to
earnings attained on the previous
job.  This means the option value
of the search will depend on the
worker’s current skill level, the
effect of prospective employment
status on the worker’s skills, and
the level of the worker’s previous
earnings.  The effect on this option
FIGURE 4
Expected present values of wages, search costs,
and unemployment compensation
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Note: Stars indicate the optimal search intensity for each unemployment
compensation regime.
the possibility that an existing job terminates
against the will of the worker.  Exposing the
worker to a small probability of involuntary
job loss each period tends to diminish the op-
tion value of a further job search, and can di-
minish the reservation wage.
Human capital or skills—We have made
earnings depend on human capital or skills.ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 8
value of unemployment compensation and the
latter’s dependence on past earnings form an
important part of our analysis.
Representing economic turbulence
Our model contains two types of parame-
ters that can be used to represent labor market
turbulence, a parameter representing firing or
job dissolution and parameters governing the
rate at which human capital depreciates while
unemployed. We will use one particular
parameter from the latter set to measure turbu-
lence, namely a parameter that sets the one-
time depreciation in skill level that an employed
worker experiences upon becoming unem-
ployed.  In tranquil times, we let the worker
experience no immediate depreciation in human
capital, but in turbulent times, we expose the
worker to a one-time reduction in human capital.
This is our way of roughly capturing the dis-
parity in skills used in different jobs.  In tran-
quil times, skills are more transferable than in
turbulent times, when job descriptions change
more quickly.
Consequences of additional features
The modifications of the basic model, in
our view, provide a more realistic picture of
the incentives unemployed workers face.  Given
the possibility that a job may terminate, the
unemployed worker takes into account not only
current unemployment compensation, which is
linked to past earnings, but also the fact that
future unemployment compensation will be
linked to future earnings, which depend on the
worker’s base wage and human capital level.
Because the human capital level deteriorates
with the passage of time spent unemployed,
the worker will balance the benefits of waiting
for a higher base wage against the prospects
of further deterioration of human capital
while unemployed.
The balance will depend on the level of
unemployment compensation.  High unemploy-
ment compensation sets the following trap.
Consider a worker who had relatively high
earnings before losing a job and, therefore,
qualifies for a high level of unemployment
compensation.  This worker’s reservation base
wage and search intensity each depend on his
or her human capital level.  Early in a spell of
unemployment, the worker searches intensive-
ly, and sets a reasonable reservation base wage,
because his or her earnings are the product of
that wage and the human capital level and,
even for typical wages, the associated earnings
compare favorably with unemployment com-
pensation.  However, if the worker remains
unemployed for a while and experiences a
deterioration in human capital, the incentives
change adversely.  The worker’s unemploy-
ment compensation remains high (tied to previ-
ous earnings), but for any given prospective
draw from the base wage distribution, the earn-
ings are lower because of diminished human
capital.  Because the benefits of searching have
declined relative to the compensation for re-
maining unemployed, the worker will tend to
search less intensively and to set a higher reser-
vation base wage.  This behavior, in turn, will
diminish the worker’s probability of leaving
unemployment and increase the mean duration
of unemployment.
Human capital acquisition can also repre-
sent a source of quits or voluntary separations.
A worker with low human capital may accept a
lower base wage than one who has higher hu-
man capital.  Having subsequently experienced
growth in human capital, the worker may find
it optimal to quit the job and search for a high-
er base wage to capitalize on his or her higher
human capital.
Equilibrium: Many workers
The search model captures the experiences
of an individual worker as time and opportuni-
ties pass.  We can use it as a building block to
model the behavior of a large number of ex ante
identical but ex post diverse workers composing
a complete labor market.  To build a model of
the labor market, we reinterpret the search model’s
individual descriptive statistics—average dura-
tion of unemployment, average accepted wage,
average times between incidents of quitting or
being fired—as applying to the average at any
point in time of a large number of statistically
identical individuals.
Imagine the labor market as a set of lakes
connected by inlet and outlet streams (see
figure 6).  The volume of water in each lake
represents the number of people in a particular
labor market state (for example, employed and
unemployed with different levels of human
capital), and the flows between lakes represent
rates of hiring, firing, and quitting. The system
is in equilibrium when all lake levels are con-
stant over time, which means that inflows
balance outflows for each lake.  The rates of
inflow and outflow are the critical determinantsFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 9
of the lake levels.  The individual search model
lends itself to becoming a model of these inflow
and outflow rates.  For example, we can interpret
the probability of job acceptance as determining
the rate of flow from a state of unemployment
to a state of employment.
Within such a model, government-supplied
unemployment compensation gives rise to
expenditures that must be financed.  In particu-
lar, the size of the unemployment lake (or lakes)
determines the total volume of government
unemployment compensation payments.  We
suppose that these are financed from income
taxes and that, in a state of equilibrium, govern-
ment expenditure rates and tax rates must be set
so that the government budget balances.
Numerical examples
We use numerical simulations to illustrate
the equilibrium forces at work in our aggregate
model of the labor market.  Our results are
mainly driven by two sets of parameters—the
skill technology and the unemployment com-
pensation scheme.6
Our model includes 21 skill levels and
assumes that all new entrants to the labor mar-
ket start out with the lowest skill level.  After
each two-week period of employment that is
not followed by a layoff, the worker has a one
in four chance to increase skills by one level;
otherwise, the skill level remains
unchanged.  Employed workers
who have reached the highest
skill level retain those skills until
becoming unemployed.  It will
take a worker who is continuously
employed, on average, about
three years and one month to
reach the highest skill level.  We
assume that the stochastic depre-
ciation of skills during unemploy-
ment is twice as fast as the accu-
mulation of skills.  That is, after
each two-week period of unem-
ployment, there is a one in two
risk that the worker’s skills de-
crease by one level; otherwise,
they remain unchanged.  Once the
lowest skill level is reached through
depreciation, the worker remains
at that level until becoming em-
ployed.  Finally, in a period of
being laid off, it is assumed that
the worker keeps the skill level
from the last period of employment.  As pointed
out above, our definition of tranquil economic
conditions implies that skill depreciation is
related only to the time spent unemployed;
there is no unusual loss of skills associated
with the layoff itself.
Figure 7 depicts a random realization of
skills for a new entrant into the labor market.
The vertical dotted lines separate periods of
employment and unemployment.  According to
the figure, the worker’s first job lasts for almost
two years, during which he or she accumulates
considerable skills.  However, the following
3.5 month spell of unemployment is associated
with skill depreciation.  After finding a second
job, the worker remains there for three years
and attains the highest skill level.  Following
another short spell of unemployment, the
worker finds a third job and regains the skills
lost during unemployment.
Concerning the unemployment compensa-
tion scheme, we examine the outcome for two
economies, one with unemployment insurance
and one without.  The economy with unem-
ployment insurance is called the welfare state
(WS) and has a 70 percent replacement ratio,
that is, unemployment benefits cover 70 percent
of lost earnings for laid off workers.7  The econ-
omy with no unemployment insurance is called
the laissez-faire (LF) economy.
FIGURE 6












Notes: Employment flows and reservoirs in a model with birth/death, firing,
quitting, and decisions to accept or refuse job offers.  Here U1 and U2 denote
pools of unemployed workers of low human capital and high human capital,
respectively; N1 and N2 measure employed workers of low human capital and
high human capital, respectively; a is a given birth/death rate; and l is a
given layoff rate.ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 10
proportion of long-term unem-
ployed at any point in time.  In
the WS economy, 14.0 percent of
currently unemployed workers
have unemployment spells to date
greater than or equal to six months
(and 5.1 percent greater than or
equal to 12 months), compared
with 4.7 percent (0.3 percent) in
the LF economy.  However, in
absolute numbers these long-term
unemployed workers constitute a
very small portion of the total
labor force; a 3.3 percent income
tax is sufficient to finance the
unemployment insurance scheme
in the WS economy.
To understand why the equi-
libria in these two economies are
virtually the same, we make a
connection between the workers’
behavior, as discussed earlier, and
the economy’s aggregate perfor-
mance.  Let us track a large group of workers
who lost their jobs after having attained the
highest skill level.  Although we can not deter-
mine precisely the fate of each individual un-
employed worker (since luck plays a role in
what wage offers an individual obtains), we
can compute average outcomes for these work-
ers as a group.  Specifically, at different unem-
ployment durations, we can estimate the hazard
rate of gaining employment, that is, the pro-
portion of still unemployed workers who gain
employment in the current two-week period
(see figure 8).
As shown in figure 8, the
hazard of gaining employment in
the LF economy is first increasing
and then decreasing.  These dy-
namics are completely driven by
changing reservation wages over
the unemployment spell.  Initial-
ly, these workers with the highest
skill level have nothing more to
gain in terms of skills so they find
it optimal to search for a very
good wage, that is, they choose
high reservation wages.  As time
goes by, some workers are unlucky
in their job search and their skills
start depreciating due to unem-
ployment.  It then becomes opti-
mal for them to choose a lower
FIGURE 7
Random realization of a worker’s skill level
under tranquil economic conditions
Note: The vertical dotted lines separate periods of employment (skill











Table 2 reports on the equilibria under
tranquil economic times for the WS economy
and the LF economy.  It might be surprising to
see that the economies look very similar in
terms of unemployment levels and duration.
The unemployment rate is only eight-tenths of
a percentage point higher in the WS economy.
The average unemployment spell is 11.6 weeks
in the WS economy versus 9.4 weeks in the
LF economy.  However, the WS economy has
considerably more dispersion in the duration
of unemployment spells, as indicated by the




Unemployment rate (percent) 7.11 6.33
Average duration of
unemployment (weeks) 11.6 9.4
Percent of unemployed
with spells so far ³ 6 months 14.0 4.7
Percent of unemployed
with spells so far ³ 12 months 5.1 0.3
Tax financing unemployment
benefits (percent) 3.3 n.a.
Note: n.a. indicates not applicable.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 11
find jobs paying more than their
current replacement ratio of 70
percent.  But after this initial
period, the hazard of gaining
employment falls dramatically in
the WS economy.  Long-term
unemployed workers in the WS
economy become disillusioned
when they experience skill depre-
ciation.  In other words, the pas-
sage of time makes the prospect
of finding a job less attractive,
compared with living on unem-
ployment benefits.  These workers
hold out for a very good wage
offer before giving up their gener-
ous benefits (relative to their
currently low skills).  Since it is
rare to find such good wage offers,
they reduce their investment in
job search, that is, they reduce the
intensity of their job search.
Under the assumed tranquil
economic conditions, these incentive problems
in the WS economy have only a small impact
on the aggregate outcome.  The average dura-
tion of unemployment in the WS economy is
only 11.6 weeks, as shown in table 2.  So most
unemployed workers find jobs before becom-
ing disillusioned.
A transient economic shock
The unemployment dynamics described
above make the WS economy more vulnerable
to economic shocks than the LF economy.
This can be demonstrated by examining the
economies’ behavior in response to a transient
unemployment shock.  We assume that the
normal layoff rate increases sharply (twentyfold)
in a single two-week period, and that everyone
who becomes unemployed in this particular
period immediately loses 75 percent of his or
her skills.  After this one-period shock, both
economies revert to their normal layoff and
skill depreciation/accumulation rates.  Policy
parameters, such as taxes and the unemploy-
ment compensation program, are kept constant
throughout the experiment.  It follows that the
economies will eventually return to the equilib-
ria in table 2.8
As shown in figure 9, the shock causes
unemployment rates in both economies to jump
initially by about 16 percentage points.  Howev-
er, in the LF economy, the high unemployment
FIGURE 8
Hazard of gaining employment as a function
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Notes: We assume an initial skill level equal to the highest one.  The curves
show the fraction of still unemployed workers who gain employment in any
given two-week period after the layoff, with the workers’ last earnings
belonging to the most common income class.
reservation wage, thereby increasing the
chance of finding an acceptable job and reduc-
ing the risk of further skill deterioration.  This
accounts for the increasing segment of the
hazard function in figure 8.  However, a very
small group of the unemployed workers in the
LF economy will find themselves unemployed
for more than a year (0.3 percent of all unem-
ployed, as shown in table 2).  These workers
will once again find it optimal to choose higher
reservation wages; because they have already
lost most of their skills, the cost of searching
for a better wage has actually gone down.
Consider a similar group of laid off work-
ers in the WS economy.  Because these work-
ers receive unemployment benefits with a
replacement ratio of 70 percent, we have to
make an assumption about their lost earnings.
(As mentioned earlier, their choice of reserva-
tion wages and search intensities will depend
on their unemployment compensation.)  Figure
8 depicts the hazard of gaining employment in
the WS economy, under the assumption that
lost earnings were in the most common income
class.  Note that the LF and WS curves in figure 8
are remarkably similar during the first four
months.  Despite their unemployment compen-
sation, workers in the WS economy choose to
search for and accept jobs in similar ways to
those in the LF economy.  They are eager toECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 12
these workers also reduce search
intensities to balance the small
prospective gains with the utility
costs of search.
Panels A and B of figure 10
show how long-term unemploy-
ment gradually emerges after the
shock.  At any point, the figures
decompose unemployment into
the fraction of unemployed work-
ers who have been unemployed
for at least one year, those who
have been unemployed for be-
tween six months and one year,
and those who have been unem-
ployed for less than six months.
Not surprisingly, both of the first
two measures of unemployment
fall at the time of the shock,
when there is a flood of newly
laid off workers.  The two mea-
sures then rise predictably after six months
and 12 months, respectively.  The problem of
long-term unemployment in the WS economy
shows up starkly in panel A of figure 10.  In
contrast, the LF economy (panel B) has a much
lower incidence of long-term unemployment,
and there is hardly any persistence in the
fractions of long-term unemployed, com-
pared with the WS economy.
FIGURE 9












deviation from normal unemployment, percentage points
WS economy
LF economy
rate dies out quickly because unemployed
workers search intensively for jobs paying less
than their previous employment.  In contrast,
workers in the WS economy enter a prolonged
period of unemployment because, given their
depreciated skills, they have difficulty finding
jobs that they prefer to their unemployment
compensation (which is based on past earn-
ings).  Besides setting high reservation wages,
FIGURE 10
Response in the decomposition of the unemployed with respect
to the length of unemployment spells so far
Notes: The percentage of unemployed workers with at least six months (12 months) of unemployment
to date is below the black line (colored line).  The percentage above the black line is then unemployed
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Turbulent economic times
Below, we show how the poor unemploy-
ment performance of the WS economy in re-
sponse to a transient economic shock will persist
during times of ongoing economic turbulence.
We define economic turbulence in terms of the
mean and variance of skill losses associated
with layoffs.  At the time of a layoff, we assume
that a worker draws a new skill
level from one of the distribu-
tions in figure 11.  The range of
each distribution starts at the
lowest possible skill level and
ends at the worker’s skill level
before the layoff.  In other words,
the worker stands to lose some of
his or her skills immediately and
a few workers may even draw a
significantly lower skill level in
the left-hand tail of the distribu-
tion.  During the unemployment
spell itself and at times of con-
tinuing employment, skills depre-
ciate and accumulate as before.
The new skill technology is
illustrated in figure 12 analogously
to figure 7.  In fact, both figures
depict exactly the same realization
of the direction of skill movements
during unemployment spells and at
times of continuing employment.
The only difference is that the new skill technolo-
gy may give rise to additional skill losses exactly
at the time of layoffs.  As can be seen, the extra
skill loss is pretty modest at the first layoff, but
the second time around the skill loss is close to
30 percent of the worker’s accumulated skills.
The extra skill losses occasionally associated
with job losses (figure 12) affect
the unemployed worker’s search
intensity and reservation wage, as
discussed in the case of a transient
unemployment shock above.  This
means that the length of unem-
ployment spells can vary between
figures 7 and 12 because of the
different incentives confronting
these two unemployed workers.
We want to know how these
changes will affect economy-wide
average rates of unemployment
and long-term unemployment in
the WS and LF economies.
To address this question,
we compute equilibria for each
degree of economic turbulence in
Figure 11.  We use the equilibria
under tranquil economic condi-
tions (discussed above) as a bench-
mark case.9  As shown in figure 13,
unemployment remains virtually
FIGURE 11
The probability distribution of a worker’s skills
immediately after a layoff
1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0
skill level
Notes: The range starts at the lowest skill level and ends at the worker’s skill
level before the layoff.  (The current graph is drawn for a worker who had
attained skill level 3 before the layoff.)  The thick colored line, black line, and
thin colored line refer to different degrees of economic turbulence indexed
by a variance of .010, .015, and .0175, respectively.
FIGURE 12
Random realization of a worker’s skill level under
turbulent economic times
Note: The vertical dotted lines separate periods of employment (skill
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Unemployment rates under different
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unemployment rate
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Long-term unemployed with
spells of at least one year
increases to 9.1 percent under the highest degree
of economic turbulence (indexed by .0175).
Conclusion
Our analysis suggests that high unemploy-
ment rates in Europe can be attributed to the
adverse incentive effects of generous welfare
programs in times of economic turbulence.
According to this view, the smooth perfor-
mance of the European welfare states up to
the 1970s was due to tranquil economic times,
while the current unemployment crisis has
been brought about by a change in the econom-
ic environment that required increased adapt-
ability of the workers forced to change jobs.
Since generous benefits based on past earnings
greatly diminish the incentives for individual
workers to accept a transition to a new job,
where skills once again have to be accumulat-
ed, our model predicts a high incidence of
long-term unemployment in the welfare states.
In fact, more than half of all those currently
unemployed in Europe have been out of a job
for more than a year.
Our analysis highlights the need to reform
European social insurance programs.  This is a
real challenge, because a more turbulent eco-
nomic environment has both reduced the effec-
tiveness of existing social safety nets and in-
creased the perceived need for social insur-
ance.  But the fact remains that it is more im-
portant than ever to incorporate incentives to
work in the design of social safety nets.  Fail-
ure to do so threatens to produce high and
long-term unemployment and needlessly to
waste human capital.
flat in the LF economy in response to increased
economic turbulence, while both the unemploy-
ment rate and the incidence of long-term unem-
ployment rise sharply in the WS economy (in the
LF economy, long-term unemployment remains
low and therefore is not visible in figure 13).
The explanation of these patterns is essentially
the same as that for the responses to a transient
economic shock.  Moreover, the pressure to fi-
nance the unemployment compensation scheme
in the WS economy naturally increases with
economic turbulence.  Thus, the tax rate of 3.3
percent required to finance unemployment com-
pensation under tranquil conditions (see table 2)
NOTES
1This article summarizes our research on European unem-
ployment, and a more detailed account can be found in
Ljungqvist and Sargent (1995).
2The notion of unemployment compensation should be
interpreted broadly in our framework.  The welfare states
have various programs assisting individuals out of work.
For example, totally disabled persons in the Netherlands
in the 1980s were entitled to 70 percent (80 percent prior
to 1984) of last earned gross wage until the age of 65—
after which they moved into the state pension system.  At
the end of 1990, disability benefits were paid to 14 per-
cent of the Dutch labor force and 80 percent of them were
reported to be totally disabled.  (See Organization of
Economic Cooperation and Development 1992).
3In contrast to our labor supply explanation, earlier theories
of European unemployment have focused on a shortfall in
the demand for labor due to insufficient aggregate de-
mand (Blanchard et al. 1986), trade union behavior driven
by insider–outsider conflicts (Blanchard and Summers
1986; Lindbeck and Snower 1988), hiring and firing costs
(Bentolila and Bertola 1990), and capital shortages (Mal-
invaud 1994).  Our analysis will instead bear out the
assertion by Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991, p. 62)
that the “unconditional payment of benefits for an indefi-
nite period is clearly a major cause of high European
unemployment.”  However, our model differs sharply
from their framework, which emphasizes hysteresis and
nominal inertia in wage and price setting.
4Formally, the conditional expectation of wages exceeding
a reservation wage, w –, is given by
,
(1 – F(w –))
Ew –     (w) = 
ò wf(w)dw
¥
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where ƒ(w) is the probability density function for wage
offers, and F(w –) = Prob(w £ w –) = ò0 f(w)dw is the cumu-
lative density function.
5A troublesome feature of the basic search model is the
existence of the always rejected part of the wage distribu-
tion beneath the reservation wage.  The presence of such
offers justifies the time the worker waits for higher ones.
But if such offers are always rejected, why do firms
continue to make them?  This conceptual problem has
been circumvented by reinterpreting the wage as an
overall measure of worker–firm job match quality.  Many
features influence the quality of matches between hetero-
geneous collections of workers and jobs. The idea is to
reinterpret the wage as a match parameter that aggregates
these diverse features of a job–person match.  Thus, a
worker–firm pair is actually jointly drawing a match
quality each time an unemployed worker receives a job
offer.  We still interpret this parameter as the wage of the
worker, but regard it as compensation for a particular
match quality.  This interpretation leaves room for offers
that are rejected by one worker to be accepted by another,
because they are different matches.
6For a detailed discussion of all parameter values in our
model, see Ljungqvist and Sargent (1995).
7Workers who have quit their jobs and new entrants to the
labor market are not entitled to any benefits in our model.
Moreover, the insured unemployed workers are disquali-
fied from receiving benefits if they are discovered turning
down job offers that would have earned them at least as
much as their current unemployment compensation.
8We assume that the extra government expenditures on
unemployment compensation in the WS economy are
financed by levying lump-sum taxes, that is, nondistor-
tionary taxes.
9The tranquil economic environment has a zero variance
according to our definition of economic turbulence.  Recall
that our earlier assumption was that a newly laid off worker
kept his or her skills from the last period of employment.
w –
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